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and other pertinent clauses of the constitudoes not alter this situation. Thus no
invalidity is shown with respect to plaintiffs'

ti~n

hypothecized express trust, from which a

resulting trust would follow. The.position
of plaintiffs is that of employes seeking to
enforce contractual rights, and not of beneficiaries of either an express or resulting
trust.

21 Cal.Rptr. 585
In re ESTATE of Joseph GILMAKER,

Deceased.
Joseph Louis GILMAKER. Petitioner
and Appellant,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST
AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, as Trus-

tee, etc., Defendant and Respondent.
In ro ESTATE of Joseph GILMAKER,.

Deceased.
In- summary, the salary deductions which
plaintiffs here seek to recover were, as
Joseph Louis GILMAKER, Contest.nt
plaintiffs 'concede, made under a mistake
and Appellant,
of law·as to the effect of the 1935 charter
v.
amendments upon their contractual rights BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST
as city employes. The same mistake of law
AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, .s Trusresulted in the payment to plaintiffs of pentee, etc., Petitioner and Respondent.
sions computed upon a fixed rather than a
L. A. 26397, 26186.
fluctuating basis. Plaintiffs' causes of acSupreme Court of Callfornla,
tion asking payment of increased past due
In Bank.
pension instalments as weB as for reimMay 15, 1962.
bursement of salary deductions seek to recover money due for breach ,of an employment contract and are actions at law. (AbProceeding by consultant under trust
bott v. City of Los Angeles (1958), supra,
instrument
for removal and substitution of
50 Ca1.2d .438,462 [22bl, 326 P.2d 484.) It
a
trustee.
The Superior Court, Los An_foHows that the six-months' claims provisions of the city charter apply to the salary geles Coupty, George Francis, J., assigned
deductions, as they do with respect to past by chairman of Judicial Council, denied the
due pension payments, and here bar recov- motion and consultant appealed. In a sepaery of any such deduction made more than rate proceeding, the testamentary trustee
six months prior to the filing of claims sought instructions concerning its power.
therefor by the respective plaintiffs. Plain- The Superior Court, Los Angeles County,
tiffs concede that all salary deductions were Beach Vasey, J., made an order instructing
made prior to the commencement of such the trustee and consultant appealed. The
. Supreme Court, Traynor, J., held that
six months' period.
trustee's failure to comply with provisions
The judgments are reversed with direc- of ,trust instrument limiting amount of
tions to the trial court to enter judgments funds that could be deposited in a single
in favor of plaintiffs in accordance with-the
bank and requiring a segregated semi-an-conc1usions dec1ared in the foregoing opinnual accounting, and the constant hostility
ion, if the court finds that it can do so: upon
between consultant named in the instrument
the present record, and, if not, then
the
.,
and the trustee with respect to administracourt is directed to take such further evi- . tion of the trust required removal and subdence as may be necessary to compu~~ :the stitution of the trustee. '
: ;.
amounts due to each plaintiff, to make such
Orders denying re~~val and isub~titu_
computations, and thereupon to enter ';judgtion of trustee and instructing trustee rements accordingly.
versed.

GIBSON, C. J., and TRAYNOR, McCOMB, PETERS, WHITE and DOOLING, JJ., concur.
371 P.2d-21

Opinions, 12 Cal.Rptr. 583, 13 Cal.Rptr.
56u, and 17 Cal.Rptr. 158, 366 P.2d 510,
vacated,
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I. Trusls <8=>167

Other beneficiaries were not indispensable parties to proceeding for removal
of trustee where consultant's notice of motion to remove trustee and supporting affidavit fully set forth facts relied upon for
relief and the trustee appeared and defended on the merits.
2. Trusts <8=>167

Notice of motion to remove trustee and
supporting affidavit, coupled with trustee's
appearance, were sufficient to invoke trial
court's general equity jurisdiction.
3. Appeal and Error <8=>77(1)

Order denying motion to remove a
trustee was appealable as a final judgment in

the action. West's Ann.Prob.Code, § 1240;
West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 963, subd. 1.
4. Trusts <8=>166(1)

Hostility between beneficiary and trustee is ground for removal of trustee when
hostility impairs proper administration of
trust.
5. Trusts <8=>167

Removal and substitution of trustee is
largely within discretion of trial court.
6. Trusts <8=>166(1)

Trustee's failure to comply with provisions of trust instrument limiting amount
of funds that could be deposited in a single
bank and requiring a segregated semiannual
accounting, and constant hostility between
consultant named in instrument and trustee
with respect to administration of trust required removal and substitution of trustee.
National Housing Act, § 401 et seq., 12 U.S.
C.A. § 1724 et seq.; Federal Deposit Insurance Act, § 1 et seq., 12 U.S.C.A. § 1811
et seq.; West's Ann.Code Civ.Proe. § 1700.-

6.
Eric A. Rose and Pray, Price & Williams, Long Beach, for appellant.
Johnson & Johnson and George R. John·
son, Long Beach, for respondent.
TRAYNOR, Justice.
In his will Joseph Gilmaker created a
testamentary trust. Under the terms of the

trust instrument, which -was incorporated in
the final decree of distribution, the Bank of
America is to serve as trustee and petitioner Joseph Louis Gilmaker is to be the
sole life beneficiary, On his death the remainder is to go to petitioner's wife and
children. Petitioner is also appointed by
the trust instrument as "Consultant, and the
Trustee shall not sell, lease, exchange, hypothecate, or improve any property which is
a part of the trust estate, or invest or reinvest any trust estate funds until it has first
notified said Consultant in writing of its intention to so act and received from said
Consultant his written approval of the
action so proposed."
A large part of the trust property is undivided one-half interests in parcels of real
property, the other one-half of which is
owned by petitioner. The trust instrument
provides that "The trustee shall not maintain in anyone bank or branch thereof a
cash balance of more than the maximum
balance insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, but shall distribute
trust funds among as many banks as necessary to secure full protection against loss
through bank failure." The trustee, however, "shall accept and comply With any
instructions of defendant's said son, JOSEPH LOUIS GILMAKER, relating to
the selection of banks in which such deposits are to be made." The trustee is also
to provide the consultant "semi-annually
with an itemized statement setting out income and expense for each parcel of improved real estate in the trust estate, and
[he] shall be consulted regarding the
amount of fire and other insurance carried
on each parcel."
Petitioner moved for the removal and
substitution of the trustee. He alleged in
his motion, and stated in his affidavit, that
the trustee had maintained $49,000 in one
bank account; that the trustee has refused
to provide him with the semi-annual accounting called for by the trust instrument;
and that the trustee has refused to consult with him as provided in the trust instrument. The motion for removal was de-
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nied. In a separate proceeding the trustee
sought instructions concerning its power.
The trial cuurt found 'that the Htrustee has
the sole, power to propose the investment
and re-investment of trust fu~ds" subject
to the approval of the consultant. Petitioner appeals from the order denying removal
and the order instructing the trustee.

102 Cal. 537, 541, 36 P. 864; In re Oary,
112 Cal. 292, 294-295, 44 P. 569; Faxon
v. All Persons, 166 Cal. 707, 712, 137 P.
919, L.R.A.l916B, 1209; see also, Schlyen
v. Schlyen, 43 Cal.2d 361, 378, 273 P.2d 897;
Coons v. Henry, 186 Cal.App.2d 512, 519, 9
Cal.Rptr. 258; Estate of Mullins, 190 Cal.
App.2d 413, 417-418, 12 Cal.Rptr. 3; Phillips v. Beilsten, 164 Cal.App.2d 450, 457458, 330 P.2d 912; d. Estate of Davis, 136
Cal. 590, 597, 69 P. 412; King v. Chase,
159 Cal. 420, 424-425, 115 P. 207), and its
order denying petitioner's motion is appealable as a final judgment in the action.
(Code Civ.Proc. § 963, subd. 1.)

[1-3] In Estate of Schloss, 56 Cal.2d
248,253-256, 14 Cal.Rptr. 643, 363 P.2d 875,
we held that the superior court sitting in
probate has no jurisdiction to remove a
trustee of a testamentary trust after distribution (see Prob.Code, §§ 112(}"1130) and
that the court's power to remove such a
Petitioner contends that the trustee viotrustee must be exercised pursuant to its
lated
its duty by maintaining $49,000 in one
general equity jurisdiction. (See Civ.Code,
bank
account
and by refusing to provide a
§ 2283.) In support of this conclusion we
pointed out that the Legislature made no particularized semi-annual accounting. He
provision for an appeal from an order in further contends that hostility and disprobate removing a trustee. (See Prob. agreement between him apd the trustee
Code, § 1240.) The trustee contends, there- prevents the consultation the testator confore, that the trial court did not err in sidered essential to the proper administradenying petitioner's motion in the probate tion of the trust. The trustee contends
proceedings to remove it as trustee and that that it is willing to fonow petitioner's sugthe appeal from that order must be dis- gestions concerning the deposit of the $49,missed. In the Schloss case, however, the 000, but that the petitioner has thus far
trustees raised the question of jurisdiction suggested only savings and loan associaby demurring to the petition for their re- tions and not banks insured by the F edermoval in the trial court, and that question al Deposit Insurance Corporation; and
was the principal issue on appeal. In the that it is willing to make the kind of semiannual accounting called for by the trust
present case, the trustee did not object
instrument but that such an accounting
in the trial court to its assumption of juriswould be an extraordinary service for
diction and did not raise the question on apwhich it would charge an extraordinary fee.
peal until after the appeal was decided by
The trustee further contends that all its
the District Court of Appeal and a hearing
suggestions for investment have been pruwas granted in this court. Petitioner's nodent; that the consultant's only function
tice of motion to remove the trustee and its
is to veto and not to advise; and that whatsupporting affidavit fully set forth the facts
ever _hostility exists between the trustee
relied upon for relief, the trustee appeared
and -the consultant has not impaired the
and defended on the merits, and the other
proper administration of the trust.
beneficiaries were not indispensable parties.
By maintaining $49.000 in cash in one
(Bowles v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 574,
584, 283 P.2d 704.) Under these circum- trust account the trustee failed to foIlow
stances the notice of motion and supporting the trust directions. Under the trust inaffidavit coupled with the trustee's appear- strument the trustee could keep no more
ance were sufficient to invoke the trial funds in one bank than was insured by the
court's general equity jurisdiction (In re Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
.Thompson's Estate, 101 Cal. 349, 353-354, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
35 P. 991, 36 P. 98, 508; In re De Leon, insures a maximum of $10,000 of any trust
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estate deposited in a bank. (12 V.S.C.A. §
1817(i).) It is true that the instructions
given by the consultant to deposit the mon~
ey in designated. savings and loan associations were insufficient. Savings and
loan association accounts can be insured
by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, not by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. (See 12 U.
S.CA. § 1724 et seq.; 12 U.S. CA. § 1811
et seq.) Even in the absence of sufficient
directions from the consultant, however,
the trustee was under the duty to place the
funds in various institutions where they

would be fully insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Furthermore,
the trustee was under a duty to provide the

consultant with a semi-annual accounting
of receipts and disbursements for each par~
cel of real estate in the trust. It may be.
as the trustee contends, that usually such
an accounting is extraordinary and that its
practice is to report the receipts and dis~
bursements for the entire trust without
segregating the parcels. In the trust in~
strument, however, the trustee expressly
agreed to provide a segregated accounting. The annual compensation of the trus~
tee is to be three-quarters of one per cent
of the reasonable value of the trust estate, and "For any unusual or special services, a reasonable additional compensation."
The trustee cannot now contend that a
service it expressly agreed to provide is
unusual or special.

[4] Hostility between the beneficiary
and the trustee is a ground for removal of
the trustee when the hostility impairs the
proper administration of the trust (Brown
v. Memorial Nat. Home Foundation, 162
Cal.App.2d 513, 534, 329 P.2d Jl8, 75 A.L.
R.2d 427; OverelJ v. OvereIJ, 78 Cal.App.
251, 258-260, 248 P. 310; Vest v. Bialson,
365 Mo. Jl03, Jl21-1122, 293 S.w.2d 369,
63 A.L.R.2d 504; Rest. of Trusts, § 107,
comment c; 1 Scott on Trusts (2d ed.),
p. 778; Bogert on Trusts (2d ed.), § 527,
pp. 376-378.)
The hostility between the trustee and petitioner has been constant and intense.

There has been disagreement over t11e investment of the surplus cash; over who
should collect the rents from the real property j and over the kind of insurance to
carryon the property. At one time, according to uncontradicted testimony. one of
the trustee's senior trust officers told petition.er: "Now, listen here. You've been
coming down here at least once a week
bothering us and you do not have to come
back any more. I'll put a stop to this and
we'll petition the Court for instructions
relating to the investments."
The proper administration of the trust
requires that there be no hostility between
the trustee and the beneficiary-consultant.
U 'Consultant' means a person not a
trustee designated in a trust to advise or direct the trustee in respect of any matters
or things connected with the trust, or whose
consent or approval is required to purchases, sales, exchanges, or other transactions
on the part of the trustee." (Code Civ.
Proc. § 1700.6.) Petitioner is not only appointed a consultant under the trust, he is
also the sole life beneficiary; he owns an
undivided one-half interest in property the
other half of which is in the trust, and
he had experience managing the entire
property before the death of his father.
In these circumstances the task of the consultant is to advise, not simply passively
to concur or veto. The trustee does not
have, as the instructions of the trial court
stated, the "sale power to propose the investment and re-investment of trust funds."
A close working relationship is called for
between the trustee and the consultant.
Furthermore, the organization of the staff
of the trustee is -not conducive to re-establishing a relationship free from the
existing hostility. Trust decisions are made
by the trustee's trust committee. The trust
committee does not meet with outsiders.
Thus messages beween the trustee and the
consultant must pass through a trust offi~
cer, who himself has no power to make
decisions. This conduit mechanism has
magnified existing difficulties and is not
likely to improve them.
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[5,6] The removal and substitution of
a trustee is largely withi~' the discretion
of the trial .court. (JQnes v. Stubbs, 136
Cal.App.2d 490, 501-502, ..288 P.2d 939;
Estate of Keyston, 102 Cal.i\pp.2d 223, 228,
227 P.2d 17.) It is undisputed, however,
that the trustee failed', to disperse the
surplus cash of $49,000 and failed to provide a segregated semi-annual 'account~
ing. The trustee's only defense, which is
insufficient, was that it is riot legally obligated to do either. The hostility between
the trustee and petiti6ner has impaired
the proper administration of the trust, and
therefore requires the removal and substitution of the trustee.
The orders denying removal and substitution of the trustee, and instructing the trus- ,
tee, are reversed.
GIBSON, C. J., and SCHAUER, PETERS, and WHITE, JI., concur.

o im
, \"'.=••"',"'.."m"n=."
21 Cal.Rptr.589

Ernest Moody BEST, Petitioner,

••

The STATE BAR OF'CALIFORNIA,
Respondent.
L. A. 26609.
i

Supreme Court o~ California.
In Bank.
May 15, 1962.
Rehearing Denied June 13, 1962.

A proceeding was brought by an attorney to review a recommendation of the
Board of Governors of; the State Bar of
California that he be disbarred. The Sui
preme Court held that ;evidence sustained
findings that attorney viqlated Rules of Professional Conduct relating to the solicitation
of professional employment and willfully
breached his oath as an attorney never to
mislead the judge, and that the penalty of
disbarment was not excessive.
Attorney ordered disbarred.

I. Attorney and Client 08=>57

In disciplinary proceeding against attorney, findings. of .fact by local administrative ,committees and Board of Governors
of State Bar are' not binding on Supreme
Court, and Supreme Court will weigh and
pass on sufficiency ,of evidence to sustain
findings of Board of Governors.
2. Attorney and Client 08=>57

Burden is on attorney seeking to review
recommendation of Board of Governors of
State Bar in disciplinary proceeding to
show that its findings are not supported by
the evidence or that its recommendation is
erroneous or unlawful.
3. Attorney and Client 08=>53(2)

Evidence sustained -finding that attor~
ney violated Rules of Professional Conduct
relating .to solicitation of professional em~
ployment. Rules of Professional Conduct,
rules 2, 3, West's Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code
following section 6076.
4. Attorney and Client 08=>53(2)

Evidence sustained finding that attor~
ney wilifully breached his oath as attorney
never to seek to mislead judge. West's
Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6068 (d).
5. Attorney and Client e=46

Acquittal of attorney in criminal proceeding did not bar disbarment proceeding
based on same acts. West's Ann.Bus. &
Prof.Code, §§ 6075 et seq., 6106.
6. Attorney

an~

Client

~9

Disciplinary proceeding against attorney is not intended for his punishment, but
is for protection of public, courts, and legal
profession. West's Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code,
§ 6075 et seq.
7. Attorney and Client 08=>54

Trial committee did not err in permitting investigator for State Bar to be present
during certain hearings relative to charges
against attorney in disciplinary proceeding.
Rules of Procedure of State Bar, rule 8,
West's Ann.Bus. & Prof. Code, following
section 6087.

